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SAFETY LAW- OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH-THE BEN­
ZENE CASE: LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF HEALTH-ln­
dustrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Insti­
tute, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"If you win this case, somebody may die as a result."1 With 
that piercing statement at oral argument, United States Supreme 
Court Justice John Paul Stevens drew the bottom line in one of the 
major cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1980, Industrial 
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 2 com­
monly known as the Benzene Case. 
To protect workers' health, in 1978 the Secretary of Labor set 
a health standard reducing the maximum permissible benzene ex­
posure level from its previous level. American Petroleum Institute 
(API), the respondent in the Benzene Case, objected to this more 
stringent standard and challenged its validity in the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 3 API convinced that court 
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
must balance the costs of a proposed health standard against the 
benefits expected to be derived from its implementation before 
promulgating a regulation. Applying the balancing test, the Fifth 
Circuit held that OSHA had not demonstrated that workers would 
enjoy measurable benefits from a lower exposure level to benzene. 
The costs involved in implementing the standard consequently 
could not be justified by its benefits. 
The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court, set up a 
two-part test for carcinogen regulation cases. The first prong of the 
Supreme Court's test requires the Secretary to demonstrate the ex­
istence of a significant risk to employee health. The second prong 
deals with the existence of a cost-benefit test. Since the Court held 
that OSHA had failed the first part of the test by failing to show 
1. 48 U.S.L.W. 3329 (Nov. 20, 1979). 
2. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). 
3. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 
S. Ct. at 2844. Appeals by persons adversely affected by an Occupational Safety & 
Health Administration [hereinafter referred to as OSHA] regulation are taken di­
rectly to the United States circuit courts under 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976). 
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that a significant risk was presented to employee health, the Court 
never reached the cost-benefit issue. 4 
This note will explore the source and legal propriety of the 
cost-benefit balancing test which the Fifth Circuit used to overturn 
OSHA's benzene standard. The significance of the Supreme 
Court's refusal to deal with the cost-benefit issue will be ad­
dressed. This note also will discuss whether the Secretary of Labor 
can ever amass sufficient evidence of a proposed standard's benefi­
cial effects to justify the compliance costs. If too burdensome a test 
is set, OSHA, as well as other protection agencies, may be stifled 
in its efforts to provide maximum feasible safety for employees. 
II. THE OSHA STANDARD 
On February 10, 1978, the Secretary of Labor, under the au­
thority of the Occupational Safety and Health Acts (the Act), pro­
mulgated a health standard6 for occupational exposure to benzene 
which set the maximum exposure level to an airborne concentra­
tion of 'benzene at one part of benzene per million parts of air (1 
ppm) averaged over an eight-hour day.7 The previous mandatory 
standard, adopted by OSHA in 1971, provided for a maximum ex­
posure level of 10 ppm averaged over an eight-hour day.8 The Sec­
retary recommended this decrease in the permissible exposure 
level in response to the release of several studies9 conducted dur­
4. 100 s. Ct. at 2850. 
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 
6. Id. § 655. 
7. The standard is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1978); the air-borne expo­
sure levels may be found at (c)(l). The Occupational Safety and Health Commis­
sion's reasons for supporting the standard are published at 43 Fed. Reg. 597-170 
(1978). The permanent standard also requires monitoring of exposure levels and 
forces employers to advise employees about their exposure levels. 29 C.F.R. § 
191O.1028(c) (1979). Employers must implement engineering controls to bring expo­
sures within permissible limits or to the lowest level possible. Until then, employees 
must wear respirators.ld. § 191O.1028(f). The standard also requires labeling of prod­
ucts containing benzene and medical surveillance of employees. ld. § 1910.1028(i), 
(k). Direct skin and eye contact with liquid containing benzene is prohibited and 
protective clothing must be provided to employees who are likely to be exposed to 
such liquids. Id. § 1910.1028(c)(2), (h). 
8. Id. § 1910.1000, at Table Z-2. 
9. One study was reported in 1975 by Dr. Enrico Vigliani. In 1963 he partici­
pated in a study of Italian rotogravure workers exposed to inks, resins, varnishes, and 
glues containing benzene concentrations between 200 and 400 parts per million 
(ppm), with peaks up to 1500 ppm. Also studied were Italian shoe workers, whose 
work environments contained concentrations of benzene ranging between 200 and 
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ing the early 1970's which reported a significantly increased risk of 
leukemia among workers exposed to high levels of benzene. These 
studies concluded that benzene is a leukemogen, a substance that 
tends to induce the development of leukemia. 1o On the basis of 
empirical tests, the studies estimated that the risk of leukemia 
among workers exposed to substances containing various amounts 
of benzene was from two to twenty times greater than that of the 
general population. 
API, which is composed of producers and usersll of benzene 
and products containing benzene, and various industrial institutes, 
on behalf of themselves and their member companies, filed peti­
tions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
March 1978 challenging the validity of OSHA's permanent 1 ppm 
SOO ppm. He identified the risk of leukemia among these workers as 20 times greater 
than that of the general population. A 1975 review showed that after the solvent tolu­
ene was substituted for benzene in 1964, no new cases of leukemia among workers 
in the rotogravure industry were discovered. See 100 S. Ct. at 2853 n.12 (citing 
Vigliani, Leukemia Associated with Benzene Exposure, 271 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 
143 (1976)). 
Another study was reported in 1972 by Dr. Muzaffer Aksoy, a hematologist who 
is currently a professor at Istanbul University. He testified at the rulemaking hearing 
that his study reported four leukemia deaths among Turkish shoemakers caused by 
exposure to benzene concentrations in excess of 150 ppm for periods ranging from 6 
to 14 years. He estimated that the incidence of leukemia among the sample he stud­
ied was twice that which would have been expected for the population as a whole. 
Like Dr. Vigliani, Dr. Aksoy also noted a decline in the number of leukemia cases 
after other solvents were substituted for benzene. See American Petroleum Inst. v. 
OSHA, 581 F.2d at 498 n.13. 
The third study, the one most heavily relied upon by OSHA, was reported in 
1977 by Dr. Peter Infante of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health [hereinafter referred to as NIOSHl, a body created to conduct research and to 
recommend occupational safety and health standards to OSHA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 
669-671 (1976). Dr. Infante testified extensively at the hearing concerning his retro­
spectiVe epidemiological study of leukemia among workers exposed to benzene 
while employed in the production of natural rubber cast film at Goodyear's Akron, 
Ohio and St. Mary's, Ohio plants between 1940 and 1949. He found that the risk of 
death from leukemia was five times that of two control groups not exposed to ben­
zene. No specific exposure level during the period studied could be definitely estab­
lished, but it was estimated at approximately 100 ppm with occasional levels as high 
as several hundred parts per million. 
10. A leukemogen is any substance which precipitates or increases the risk of 
contracting leukemia. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1299 (1971). 
11. The producers are engaged in the petrochemical and petroleum refining in­
dustries and are responsible for 94% of the total domestic benzene production while 
the steel industry produces the remaining 6% as a by-product of the coking process. 
The users of benzene include the chemical, printing, lithograph, rubber cement, rub­
ber fabricating, paint, varnish, stain remover, adhesive, and petroleum industries. 
581 F.2d at 498. 
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benzene standard. 12 The Fifth Circuit overturned the standard be­
cause it was unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 13 
The court found no substantial evidence to support the Secretary's 
conclusion that the 1 ppm standard would result in measurable 
benefits by reducing risks to human health. In other words, there 
was no proof that any lives would be saved. 14 The Act was con­
strued to require the Secretary to engage in a formal, but not elab­
orate, cost-benefit analysis prior to ordering reduced exposure to 
toxic chemicals. 15 While agreeing with OSHA that substantial evi­
dence16 supported the conclusion that benzene caused leukemia in 
humans, the court held that OSHA had not sustained its burden of 
showing that a reduced standard would produce measurable bene­
fits. 17 
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision, but the majority never reached 
the question of whether a cost-benefit balancing test is required by 
the Act. One concurring Justice held that such a test was implied 
in the OSHA statute. 1S The four dissenting Justices felt that Con­
gress never contemplated a cost-benefit test and that such a balan­
cing test could not be derived from the complicated Occupational 
Safety and Health Act. 
Since the Supreme Court reserved judgment on the Fifth Cir­
cuit's holding that the Secretary must roughly balance the costs of 
compliance with a toxic substance health standard against the bene­
fits expected to be derived from its implementation, the fundamen­
tal issue of whether such a test is implied in the Act remains open. 
This issue can be resolved only by analyzing the purposes of the 
Act and the historical relationship between OSHA and benzene. 
12. Other intervenors or original petitioners were transferred to the Fifth Cir­
cuit for review. Id. at 499. The Industrial Union Department and the AFL-CIO inter­
vened on behalf of OSHA in support of this standard. 
Petitioners filed a motion on March 10, 1978, for a temporary stay of the 
standard. On April 18, 1978, a three-judge panel heard oral arguments and ordered a 
stay of the standard to be continued pending dispositions of the petitions for review. 
ld. at 500. 
13. ld. at 510. 
14. ld. at 503. This reflects the court's great concern about the costs to the pe­
troleum industry. 
15. ld. The court apparently wanted OSHA to ascertain the number of deaths 
which would occur at the 10 ppm exposure level and subtract the number that would 
occur at a 1 ppm exposure level in order to arrive at a concrete estimate of how 
many lives would be saved. 
16. See note 174 infra. 
17. 581 F.2d at 505. 
18. 100 S. Ct. at 2877 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Benzene 
Benzene19 is a ubiquitous hydrocarbon compound that is man­
ufactured in substantial quantities20 by the petroleum and steel in­
dustries for a wide variety of industrial uses. 21 Benzene has been 
recognized since 1900 as a toxic substance capable of causing acute 
or chronic nonmalignant abnormalities in the formed elements in 
the human blood system. When benzene vapors are inhaled, the 
benzene diffuses rapidly through the lungs and is absorbed quickly 
into the blood. 
The acute effects of exposure to high concentrations of ben­
zene are well known. Exposure to a 20,000 ppm concentration is 
often fatal within minutes, causing circulatory failure or coma. 22 
Long-term exposures to high concentrations at 40 to .500 ppm can 
cause bone marrow depression, vertigo, nervous excitation, head­
ache, nausea, and breathlessness. 23 The most common nonmalig­
nant effect of continuous exposure to benzene concentrations be­
tween 25 and 40 ppm24 is malfunctioning of the bone marrow, 25 
resulting in a deficiency in the formed elements of the blood. 26 Ex­
19. Benzene (C,;H,.) is a clear, colorless, noncorrosive, highly flammable liquid 
with a strong, rather pleasant odor. Benzene occurs naturally in small quantities (a 
few parts per billion) in certain substances, such as water supplies, animal and plant 
matter, many foods, crude oil, and the ambient air. Brief for American Petroleum 
Inst. at 6, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 
at 2844. 
20. The production of benzene is rapidly expanding in the United States. Only 
11 other chemicals and only one other hydrocarbon, ethylene, are presently being 
produced in greater tonnage. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978). 
21. The majority of the benzene produced is used as a feedstock in the manu­
facture of other organic chemicals. The remaining amounts are used in the manufac­
ture of pesticides, detergents, solvents, paint removers, and as a reactant in chemical 
laboratories. Motor fuels such as gasoline contain up to two percent benzene. 581 
F.2d at 498. 
22. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 27,467 (1977). 
23. This moderate level can also produce less severe blood abnormalities. See, 
e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 5921-22 (1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 27,467 (1977). 
24. This level may be considered "low." 43 Fed. Reg. 5924-25 (1978). 
25. Blood cells are produced in the bone marrow and exposure to benzene re­
sults in an alteration of the body's rate of production of red and white cells and 
platelets. Brief for the Secretary of Labor at 10, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 
581 F.2d at 493. 
26. Anemia, a decline in the red blood cell count, results in a decreased capac­
ity to carry oxygen to various parts of the body and is characterized by simple fa­
tigue. If undetected, the disease may develop into a more serious condition which 
exacerbates other diseases. Leukopenia, a decline in the white blood cell count, re­
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posure to benzene at 25 to 40 ppm also results in chromosomal ab­
errations. 27 Because of extensive evidence linking benzene with 
these noncancerous diseases of the blood, the American National 
Standards Institute decided in 1969 to set the permissible exposure 
level to benzene at 10 ppm. 28 That was the most recent reduction 
in the permissible exposure level prior to the promulgation of the 
Secretary's contested benzene standard. 
The undisputed relationship between benzene and leukemia 
can be stated simply: exposure to concentrations of benzene at lev­
els higher than 100 ppm causes leukemia in humans. 29 Proving this 
relationship, however, is complicated by two factors. First, there 
may be a considerable "lag" time or latency period between expo­
sure to benzene and the development of the disease. Second, some 
individual workers may be particularly sensitive to the leukemo­
genic effects of benzene, thus making determination of a "safe" ex­
posure level very difficult, if not impossible. 30 As a result of its tox­
icity, recommended exposure levels to benzene have been reduced 
constantly throughout the chemical's history. 31 The Secretary 
relied on the bleak historical background of benzene as well as on 
the legislative history of the Act to reach his decision to lower the 
permissible exposure level to 1 ppm. 
duces the capacity of the body's immunological defense system and results in recur­
rent infections. Thrombocytopenia, a decline in the platelet count, leads to impaired 
clotting of the blood and is characterized by bleeding tendencies. ld. at ll. 
27. Benzene exposure causes visible damage to chromosomes in eymphocytes 
and in blood-forming cells. These effects may be manifested as alterations in the 
numbers of chromosomes or structural rearrangement of the chromosomal material, 
including additions or deletions of chromosomes. These changes have been observed 
in workers exposed to low levels of benzene. ld. at 10 n.6. 
28. 43 Fed. Reg. 5921-25 (1978). OSHA subsequently adopted this standard in 
1971 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976). It is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000, 
Table Z-2 (1979). The standard was, however, not based on the possible 
leukemogenic effects of benzene. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,517 (1977). 
29. Leukemia is a neoplasm, or cancer, of the white blood cells characterized 
by the appearance of abnormal, immature white cells in the circulating blood, by al­
most total replacement of the bone marrow with the leukemic cells, and by wide­
spread infiltrates of the liver, spleen, and other tissues, analogous to metastatic dis­
semination of solid tissue cancer. See 43 Fed. Reg. 5925 (1978). Once leukemia is 
diagnosed, there is virtually no chance for recovery. ld. 
30. These two factors are generally accepted as applying to all diseases in the 
field of carcinogenesis. 43 Fed. Reg. 5930 (1978). 
31. In 1946, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists 
recommended a threshold limit value of benzene exposure of 100 ppm. They subse­
quently reduced the level to 50 ppm in 1947, 35 ppm in 1948, 25 ppm in 1963, and 
finally to 10 ppm in 1974. 581 F.2d at 498. 
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B. History of OSHA 
The asserted purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act32 is "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman 
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve 
our human resources. . . . "33 Congress passed the Act because pre­
vious legislative efforts to curb the human and economic loss 
caused by industrial accidents and health hazards had failed. 34 Pre­
vention of these occupational deaths and injuries was a driving 
force behind the Act. 35 OSHA was enacted when the state occupa­
tional safety and health programs of the 1960's were foundering. 
"[T]he problem of assuring safe and healthful working conditions 
became too big, too complex, and too urgent for any approach 
other than decisive federal action. "36 
During the early 1970's scientmc discoveries revealed previ­
ously unsuspected cause-and-effect relationships between occupa­
tional exposures to chemicals and many chronic cancer and heart 
diseases. 37 Statistics showed that each year, approximately 14,500 
workers died as a result of job-related injuries38 and that about 2.5 
million workers suffered on-the-job injuries. 39 This "industrial car­
nage"40 prompted congressional enactment of OSHA, which re­
jected the premise that accidents and diseases are the reasonable 
32. For a general discussion of the impact and scope of the Act, see Cohen, The 
Occupational Safety and Health Act; A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 
788 (1972); Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act; Much Ado About Some­
thing, 3 Loy. CHI. L.J. 247 (1972); Spann, The New Occupational Safety and Health 
Act, 58 A.B.A.J. 255 (1972); White & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age; The Law of Work 
Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAW. 1309 (1973); Symposium, The Developing Law of 
Occupational Safety and Health, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 317 (1974); Comment, The Occu­
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970; An Overview, 4 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 525 
(1974). 
33. Occupational Safety & Health Act § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). 
34. See S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-81; Note, 10 Hous. L. REV. 426,426-29 (1973). 
35. Meeds, A Legislative History of OSHA, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 327, 330 (1974). 
36. Id. at 331. See also Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 1340, 1345 (2d Cir. 1974); S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 
5180. 
37. Meeds, supra note 35, at 347. 
38. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15 (1970), reprinted in [1970] 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5177, 5178. This is a mortality rate two and one-half 
times greater than the number of American losses in Vietnam. 116 CONGo REC. 
38,388 (1970); S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5178. 
39. 116 CONGo REC. 38,388 (1970). 
40. S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5218-21 (views of Sen. Javits). 
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"price which workers and ultimately, society must pay in the name 
of progress. "41 Section 655(b)(5), which regulates toxic substances, 
directs the Secretary of Labor to "set the standard which most ade­
quately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health...."42 Whether this feasibil­
ity language can be construed to require a cost-benefit analysis of 
proposed standards must be determined by examination of its ap­
plication by the courts. 
C . Feasibility 
The cost-benefit test which the Fifth Circuit applied derives 
from an unknown source which the Supreme Court eventually will 
have to identifY. The search for this source must start with an anal­
ysis of the OSHA statute itself. The Act imposes several pragmatic 
limitations on the kinds of standards which the Secretary of Labor 
may promulgate. Congress gave the Secretary authority43 to pro­
mulgate only those occupational safety and health standards44 
which are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment and places of employment. "45 When setting 
health standards dealing with toxic substances, the Act compels the 
Secretary to consider "feasibility. "46 The Secretary has no authority 
to set a health standard which is infeasible. Thus, it is important to 
examine what constitutes a feasible standard in order to determine 
whether one requirement is the performance of some form of cost­
benefit test. 
1. Economic Feasibility 
Neither the statute nor its legislative history defined feasibility 
or explained how the limitations on safety. and health standards 
41. Cohen, OSHA and the Workplace Environment: An Unfulfilled Promise, 27 
N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 213, 218 (1974). 
42. 29 U.S.c. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
43. The Act gives the Secretary of Labor authority over an estimated 4.1 mil­
lion work places and 57 million employees, encompassing almost every employer ex­
cept for governmental bodies and certain employers already covered by other spe­
cific safety statutes. [1980] OSHA COMPLIANCE GUIDE (CCH) ~ 502, at 1009. See 
also 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1975.1-.6 (1979). 
44. 29 U.S.c. §§ 651(b)(3), 652(8), 655 (1976). 
45. Id. § 652(8). 
46. Id. § 655(b)(5). This requirement is only mentioned in the toxic substance 
provision but has been interpreted to apply to general standards set under § 6(a) of 
the Act. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 120-23 (3d Cir. 1975). See also 
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 
529 F.2d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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were to be established. Such determinations were to be made by 
administrative agencies and the courts through the promulgation 
and interpretation of standards. 47 No feasibility requirement ex­
isted in the original draft of section 655(b)(5). Senator Jacob Javits 
authored the feasibility amendment and stated: "[a]s a result of this 
amendment the Secretary, in setting standards, is expressly re­
quired to consider feasibility of proposed standards. "48 He consid­
ered the previous draft of the statute inadequate because it con­
tained no criteria for health and safety standards and could be 
interpreted to require absolute health and safety in all cases. As 
amended, the Act no longer could be read to require a risk-free 
working environment if that condition could not reasonably be at­
tained. The courts have helped to define feasibility by incorporat­
ing economic49 and technological5o feasibility concepts into the 
term, an interpretation adopted by the dissent in the Benzene 
Case. 51 Not all commentators, however, feel this construction of 
feasibility is proper. 52 
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,53 
J lldge McGowan, while agreeing that OSHA requires safeguards 
for employee health even though production costs are increased, 
47. Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating 
Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
285 (1978). 
48. S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5222 (views of Sen. Javits). The commit­
tee reports, draft bills, and floor debates are reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LA­
BOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ACT OF 1970 (1971). 
49. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
50. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of Plastics 
Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 
(1975); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
51. 100 S. Ct. at 2902 n.30. 
52. Sen. Javits' concern about feasibility arose in a context completely removed 
from economic considerations. The Javits amendment responded to criticism by 
some legislators that without the "feasibility language" the statute could be inter­
preted to require the Secretary to ban all occupations in which there remained some 
risk of injury, impaired health, or life expectancy. It was feared that the statute, if lit­
erally applied, could close every business in the nation. The purpose of Javits' 
amendment was to prevent OSHA from being interpreted in a way that would estab­
lish the Secretary as an absolute guarantor of employee health. This is, however, 
very different from the Court's translation of the Javits amendment into a declaration 
that Congress wanted the Secretary to consider the costs attendant to compliance 
standards. Cohen, supra note 41, at 235-36. 
53. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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stated: "[t]his is not, however, the same thing as saying that Con­
gress intended to require immediate implementation of all protec­
tive measures technologically achievable without regard for their 
economic impact. To the contrary, it would comport with common 
usage to say that a standard that is prohibitively expensive is not 
'feasible.' "54 Congress apparently did not intend to protect em­
ployees by putting their employers out of business either by 
requiring protective devices not within reach of existing technology 
or by making compliance with standards financially impossible. 55 
Congress, however, did contemplate that the Secretary's rule­
making would drive out of business some companies so "marginally 
efficient or productive" as to be unable to follow standards other­
wise universally feasible. 56 Economic feasibility is one of the cor­
nerstones of the section 655(b)(5) toxic substance standards. Judicial 
interpretation of economic feasibility will help to clarify its role in 
the promulgation of OSHA standards. 
Even though it may be technologically possible to eliminate a 
hazard from the work environment, it still may be economically in­
feasible to do so. Judicial interpretation of the economic feasibility 
requirement has been consistent among the circuits considering 
the question: a standard is economically infeasible only if compli­
ance would make "financial viability generally impossible"57 or pre­
cipitate the "massive economic dislocation" of an industry. 58 
In Hodgson, the union attacked an OSHA standard setting the 
maximum exposure level for asbestos dust. 59 Union attorneys ar­
gued that the Secretary did not set as protective a level of expo­
sure as was feasible. They also criticized the Secretary for factoring 
the economic effect of the asbestos standard on industry into his 
determination of the permissible exposure level. In rejecting the 
Union's contention, the court stated: 
Standards may be economically feasible even though, from the 
standpoint of employers, they are financially burdensome and af­
fect profit margins adversely. Nor does the concept of economic 
feasibility necessarily guarantee the continued existence of indi­
vidual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the pur­
54. 	 Id. at 477. 
55. AFL-CIO Y. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975). 
56. Id. at 123. See also S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5180. 
57. See AFL-CIO Y. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Industrial Union 
Dep't, AFL-CIO Y. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477-78. 
58. AFL-CIO Y. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1975). 
59. 499 F.2d at 477-78. 
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poses of the Act to envisage the economic demise of an em­
ployer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry in 
protecting the health and safety of employees and is conse­
quently financially unable to comply with new standards as 
quickly as other employers. 60 
This harsh view seems defensible when risks to health are so seri­
ous as to justify the demise of laggard corporations. Such a situa­
tion arose in Hodgson and in American Iron & Steel Institute v. 
OSHA,61 where OSHA sought to eliminate exposure to a known 
carcinogen. In that case, a health standard governing exposure to 
carcinogenic coke oven emissions was upheld in the face of a $240 
million to $1.2 billion compliance cost. The Secretary was aware of 
the magnitude of the costs but felt that they were affordable in 
light of the stability and profitability of the steel industry. The 
American Iron and Steel Institute presented no testimony that the 
costs would endanger the future existence of the coke industry. 
The Third Circuit formulated a new test which would require the 
Secretary only to "inquire into the economic feasibility of the 
standard. "62 The standard was economically feasible if an inquiry 
revealed that no "massive dislocation" of an industry would oc­
cur.63 The Secretary had inquired into the standard's economic fea­
sibility and had concluded that the costs were necessary in order to 
protect employees from the carcinogenic hazard, therefore the· 
health standard was upheld. 64 
The parallels between American Iron & Steel Institute and the 
Benzene Case are evident: both dealt with carcinogenic substances 
and both imposed enormous financial burdens on industry. Any 
60. Id. at 478. The court adled: 

As the effect becomes more widespread within an industry, the problem of 

economic feasibility becomes more pressing. For example, if the standard 

requires changes that a few leading firms could quickly achieve, delay might 

be necessary to avoid increasing the concentration of that industry. Simi­

larly, if the competitive structure or posture of the industry would be other­

wise adversely affected-perhaps rendered unable to compete with imports 

or with substitute products-the Secretary could properly consider that fac­

tor. These ... examples ... suggest the complex elements that may be rele­

vant to such a determination. 

6!' 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom., Republic Steel Corp. v. 

OSHA, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980). This view, pertaining to economic considerations, was 
also adopted by Judge Gibbons in Brennan, which the American Iron & Steel Insti ­
tute court found to be controlling in the Third Circuit. Id. at 835. 
62. Id. at 836-37 (emphasis added). 
63. Id. at 836 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 46,751 (1976)). 
64. [d. at 836. 
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factual differences which might exist between these two cases 
should not be significant enough to result in opposite judgments. 
The Supreme Court majority, in deciding the Benzene Case, cited 
the American Iron & Steel Institute fact situation as one success­
fully demonstrating the existence of a significant health risk. 65 No 
cost-benefit balancing test was required or voluntarily performed in 
the Hodgson or American Iron & Steel Institute carcinogen regula­
tion cases. Compliance costs were merely estimated. The economic 
impact on the industry was approximated and was found to be fea­
sible if the economic structure of the market was not undermined. 
2. Technological Feasibility 
The concept of technological feasibility is closely related to 
that of economic feasibility. The Secretary's goal is to provide em­
ployees with the greatest possible degree of health and safety pro­
tection. 66 In order to further this statutory purpose,67 OSHA must 
be interpreted to force technological development. 68 Congress 
would not have created the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health,69 which exists solely to perform OSHA's re­
search, if it were satisfied that industry should be regulated by ex­
isting safety standards. Instead, Congress mandated that OSHA 
65. 100 S. Ct. at 2871 n.64. 
66. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
67. "[T]o stimulate employers ... to institute new ... programs for providing 
safe and healthful working conditions [and to develop] ... innovative methods, tech­
niques and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems." [d. 
§ 651(b)(I),(5). 
68. See also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), construed in International 
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); National Environmen­
tal Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331, 4332 (1970), construed in Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 
(D.C. Cir. 1971); National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392, 
1394 (1970), construed in Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 
(6th Cir. 1972). 
69. NIOSH is required, on the basis of research, demonstrations and experi­
ments to: 
develop criteria dealing with toxic materials and harmful physical agents 
and substances which will describe exposure levels that are safe for various 
periods of employment, including but not limited to the exposure levels at 
which no employee will suffer impaired health or functional capacities or di­
minished life expectancy as a result of his work experience. 
29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(3) (1976). NIOSH performs this duty as the Secretary's designate. 
Id. § 671(a). NIOSH is to publish annually a list of all known toxic substances by ge­
neric family or other useful groupings, and the concentrations at which toxicity is 
known to occur. If a potentially toxic substance is not covered by any standard, 
NIOSH must so advise the Secretary. Id. § 669(a)(6) & (e). 
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constantly develop superior methods of protecting worker safety 
and health. 
The Secretary is faced with a large number of variables and 
uncertainties when setting safe exposure levels to carcinogens. 
Current scientific knowledge about the effects of exposure to car­
cinogens is generally speculative and sometimes even nonexistent, 
yet it is known that grave potential dangers exist. It is often not 
possible for the Secretary to implement the standard providing the 
greatest degree of protection for workers because of the paucity of 
evidence supporting his standard. 70 For example, since workers re­
spond differently to the same amount of exposure, the causal con­
nection between disease and exposure must be inferred from com­
plex and sometimes conflicting scientific studies.71 One commen­
tator, emphasizing that OSHA is preventive in nature, feels that 
the Secretary should be empowered to set standards with a margin 
of safety even though no firm evidence can be marshalled to show 
that such a margin is absolutely necessary. 72 OSHA's purpose will 
be undermined unless the concept of technological feasibility is 
construed to require that industry adopt new, advanced technology 
in its efforts to protect worker health and safety. 
The Secretary's authority to force technological change was 
tested in the Second Circuit case of Society of the Plastics Indus­
try, Inc. v. OSHA. 73 The petitioners challenged a maximum vinyl 
chloride exposure leveP4 by arguing that OSHA could set only 
those standards which could be implemented by presently available 
technology. The Secretary allegedly exceeded his authority by 
reducing permissible exposure to vinyl chloride to "no detectible 
level," a level which no known technology could achieve. The 
court, rejecting the industry's assertion that the health standard 
was impossible to achieve, held that "In the area of safety, ... the 
Secretary is not restricted by the status quo. He may raise 
standards which require improvements in existing technologies or 
70. Morey, Mandatory Occupational Safety and Health Standards-Some Le­
gal Problems, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 584,587 (1974). 
71. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 487. See also 
Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1159 (3d Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of La­
bor, 486 F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1973). 
72. Taylor, Reasonable Rulemaking Under OSHA: Is It Feasible?, 9 ST. 
MARY'S L.J. 215, 227 (1977). 
73. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). 
74. The vinyl chloride standard is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1979). 
OSHA Standard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974). 
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which require the development of new technology, and he is not 
limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already fully 
developed. "75 
In Society of the Plastics Industry,76 the Hodgson77 view of 
technological feasibility was adopted. The court stated: "some of 
the questions involved in the promulgation of these [regulatory] 
standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and conse­
quently as to them insufficient data is presently available to make a 
fully informed factual determination."78 Society of the Plastics In­
dustry, however, extended Hodgson's feasibility doctrine by estab­
lishing the principle that toxic substance standards may impose 
substantial economic and technological burdens on employers. The 
court allowed OSHA to set standards requiring industries to im­
prove extant technology or to develop new technology. OSHA's de­
termination of feasibility will not be overturned by industries' com­
plaints of economic or technological impossibility unless the claims 
are supported by substantial evidence. 79 
The technological feasibility requirement of Society of the 
Plastics Industry80 was modified in American Iron & Steel Insti­
tute. 81 While agreeing with Society of the Plastics Industry that 
the Secretary is not limited by existing technology in setting coke 
oven emission standards, the court refused to impose an affirmative 
duty on employers to research and to develop new technology in 
order to comply with designated exposure levels. 82 Adhering to its 
prior AFL-CIO v. Brennan83 opinion, the Third Circuit restricted 
OSHA's power to order the development of new technology by 
requiring implementation of technology which "loorm on today's 
75. 509 F.2d at 1309. Cj. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 
F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir. 1974); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 
659, 673 (6th Cir. 1972). 
76. 509 F.2d at 1301. 
77. 499 F.2d at 467. 
78. Id. at 474 (emphasis added). 
79. "OSHA, however, must consider both existing technological capabilities 
and imminent advances in the Act in determining the feasibility of an alternative." 
AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 1975). The Brennan court consid­
ered a § 655(a) noise reduction standard, not a § 655(b)(5) toxic substance standard, 
for mechanical power presses. The court felt that if "feasibility" were a valid consid­
eration under § 655(b)(5), then a fortiori it must also be applied with respect to other 
hazards under the more general language of § 655(a). 
80. 509 F.2d at 1301. 
81. 577 F.2d at 825. 
82. Id. at 838. 
83. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975). 
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horizon. "84 By relying on the Brennan case, which dealt with a 
nontoxic general health standard under section 655(a), 85 the court 
may have unduly restricted the Secretary's ability to set toxic sub­
stance standards which, to the extent feasible, protect employee 
health. The extent to which technology that "looms on today's hori­
zon" can be forced upon industries is uncertain. One authority be­
lieves that Congress intended toxic substance standards to be more 
far reaching than nontoxic standards. 86 
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA,87 American 
Iron & Steel Institute v. OSHA,88 and Industrial Union Depart­
ment, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 89 have established meaningful 
guidelines for the Secretary to follow when promulgating health 
and safety standards. If a standard is prohibitively expensive or will 
cause massive dislocation of an industry, it is economically 'infeasi­
ble. A standard may go beyond present technology to the frontiers 
of scientific knowledge and still be technologically feasible. At least 
in the Third Circuit, though, the most that can be required of in­
dustries is adoption of innovations which loom on the horizon. 
These rules may be reduced to a single criterion: OSHA must set 
toxic substance standards so that workers are exposed to dangerous 
. substances to the least extent feasible under existing or achievable 
technology. 
In setting his new 1 ppm standard, the Secretary of Labor ap­
plied this feasibility test. The costs of compliance were estimated 
to total one-half billion dollars.90 After comparing this figure with 
information on the profitability and capitalization of the affected in­
dustries, the Secretary concluded that the expenditure was feasible 
since it would not threaten the individual firms' financial welfare or 
the industry's economic viability. 91 Since the Act does not require 
a feasible standard to pass a cost-benefit test before it becomes en­
forceable, the Secretary did not balance the costs of compliance 
84. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
85. See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
86. Currier, OSHA, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1107, 1136. 
87. 509 F.2d at 1301. 
88. 577 F.2d at 825. 
89. 499 F.2d at 467. 
90. OSHA commissioned Arthur D. Little, Inc., a cost-estimating firm, to study 
the economic impact of the proposed standard on the affected industries. The firm 
estimated that first-year operating costs would be between $187 million and $705 
million, that engineering controls would cost $266 million, and that recurring annual 
costs would total $34 million. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503. 
91. Id. 
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against the standard's potential health benefits. Though the Act it­
self does not require the Secretary to conduct a cost-benefit analy­
sis, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless demanded one. The court's bal­
ancing test derived from a prior decision in an analogous suit, not 
from OSHA's enabling statute. 
IV. CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
A. Fifth Circuit's Analysis 
The API convinced the Fifth Circuit that OSHA should weigh 
the costs of contemplated standards against the benefits to be de­
rived from their implementation before promulgating health 
standards for toxic substances under section 655(b)(5)92 of the Act. 
The API derived this balancing requirement from the feasibility 
language in the toxic materials section of the Act. 93 OSHA, on the 
other hand, interpreted the Act's feasibility requirement to mean 
that standards should be achievable. The Fifth Circuit rejected 
OSHA's arguments: OSHA's enabling statute was construed to re­
quire a cost-benefit analysis for standards regulating human expo­
sure to chemicals. 94 
The court relied almost exclusively on its previous holding in 
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 95 
which arose under the Consumer Product Safety Act (Safety Act). 96 
In that case, a manufacturer of swimming pool slides successfully 
challenged a safety standard set by the Commission. The Safety 
Act requires the Consumer Product Safety Commission to find that 
a standard is "reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an un­
reasonable risk of injury" before it is approved. 97 In setting the 
standard aside, the court stated that the Commission had failed to 
show that its standard was reasonably necessary to eliminate or re­
92. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
93. The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials ... 
shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible 
... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional 
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard ... for 
the period of his working life. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
94. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 505. "Although the agency 
does not have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis ... it does have to deter­
mine whether the benefits expected from the standard bear a reasonable relationship 
to the cost imposed by the standard." Id. at 503. 
95. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). 
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2081 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the Safety Act]. 
97. Id. § 2058(c)(2)(A). 
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duce an unreasonable risk of injury.98 Because the Fifth Circuit 
found that OSHA and the Safety Act had parallel purposes, the 
"reasonably necessary"99 language shared by OSHA and the Safety 
Act were given identical constructions. 100 The Fifth Circuit, in 
Aqua Slide, found that a cost-benefit test was inherent in the 
Safety Act. 101 Hence, the court reasoned that the same balancing 
test must be incorporated into the OSHA statute. 
OSHA argued, in the alternative, that even if it should have 
performed a cost-benefit analysis, "substantial evidence" in the re­
cord as a whole, as mandated by section 655(f),102 supported the 
standard as reasonably necessary within the Aqua Slide test. API, 
however, differed with OSHA's conclusion that reducing the expo­
sure level to benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm would result in "ap­
preciable" benefits. loa According to API, that estimation was not 
supported by substantial evidence, as required by the OSHA stat­
ute.104 
The Fifth Circuit found that OSHA had not satisfactorily com­
pleted the requisite Aqua Slide cost-benefit test mainly because 
OSHA's estimate of the benefits to be derived from its new 
standard was not supported by substantial evidence. 105 Benefits 
must be quantified by assessing the best available evidence. Ac­
cording to section 655(b)(5) of the Act, establishing standards on 
the basis of the best available evidence assures that employees will 
not suffer material impairment of health even if they have regular 
exposure to hazardous substances. 106 The best available evidence 
consists of the most recent scientific data and experience gained 
under OSHA and other health and safety laws. 107 
When scientific impossibility prevents determination of an ex­
posure level's effectiveness, however, the Secretary must make a 
policy judgment as to whether it should be set at the lowest feasi­
ble level. The Secretary of Labor, in the Benzene Case, was faced 
98. 569 F.2d at 844. 
99. Sections 2(b)(I) and 9(c)(2)(A) of the Consumer Product Safety Act require 
that standards be "reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk 
of injury." 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051(b)(l), 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976). 
100. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 502-03. 
101. 569 F.2d at 839. 
102. 29 U.S.C. § 655(0 (1976). 
103. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503. 
104. Occupational Safety & Health Act § 6(0,29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976). 
105. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503-04. 
106. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
107. ld. 
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with such a choice. He knew that benzene was a carcinogen be­
cause of the results of studies performed at exposure levels higher 
than 10 ppm. He also knew that no known, safe level for benzene 
exposure existed. lOS The circuit court wanted to see substantial evi­
dence of the benefits to be gained by lowering the exposure level 
from 10 ppm to 1 ppm.t09 Since no substantial evidence existed 
which could prove or even imply that low-level exposure to ben­
zene caused leukemia, the Secretary could not prove that reduc­
tion in benzene exposure would lower the number of leukemia vic­
tims. He therefore failed to sustain his burden of proof as to the 
"benefits" component of the cost-benefit test. 110 
B. Supreme Court Majority's New Test 
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, 
upheld the circuit court's action, but on substantially different 
grounds. Justice Stevens, writing for a bare majority, held that the 
Secretary, before promulgating any health or safety standard, must 
make a threshold finding that significant risks exist at the place of 
employment and that they can be eliminated or lessened by a 
change in current practices. III If such a showing is made, then the 
standard is " 'reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment or places of employment.' "112 This finding, 
however, merely satisfies the first part of a new two-part test which 
the Court set for health and safety standards promulgated pursuant 
to section 655(b)(5). 
The second part of the test, never discussed, dealt with the 
cost-benefit balance. The Court found that the Secretary had not 
demonstrated a substantial risk and had failed part one of the test; 
therefore, the second prong of the analysis, the cost-benefit issue, 
108. The American Petroleum Institute [hereinafter referred to as API] attacked 
this position with its own evidence that threshold levels for carcinogens in general, 
and benzene in particular, do exist. Joint Brief of Petitioners, American Petroleum 
Inst., et al., at 39, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 493. The evidence 
presented is basically scientific opinion which also points out that all the studies 
presented involve higher concentrations of benzene (i.e., over 100 ppm). A "safe 
threshold" level for carcinogens is as susceptible to proof as a "no safe-exposure 
level." ld. 
109. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 504-05. 
110. ld. at 503. "Without an estimate of benefits supported by substantial evi­
dence, OSHA is unable to justify a finding that the benefits to be realized from the 
standard bear a reasonable relationship to its one-half billion dollar price tag." ld. 
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2864. 
112. ld. at 2850. 
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was never reached. 113 In fact, the Court specifically avoided the 
question of "whether section [655(b)(5)] ... requires [the Secre­
tary] . . . to select the most protective standard . . . or whether 
. . . the benefits of the regulation must be commensurate with the 
costs of its implementation. "U4 
The Court found no direct factual support for OSHA's conclu­
sion that its 10 ppm standard was unsafe and that a lower, more 
protective standard was necessary.U5 The Secretary's reasoning 
process was faulted because he relied on assumptions and not on 
facts. u6 The Secretary had established the standard by following 
OSHA's standard carcinogen policy that any exposure level above 
zero is assumed to present an increased risk of cancer, absent proof 
of a safe exposure level. U7 OS HA' s policy was then applied to sec­
tion 655(b)(5)' s requirement that standards be set at the most pro­
tective level feasible. 118 The Secretary felt that since no safe 
threshold level of exposure could be demonstrated, U9 the lowest 
exposure level that was feasible, 10 ppm, was mandated by the 
statute. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Secretary's logic over­
looked the threshold issue of whether a significant risk to human 
health, as proven by substantial evidence, even existed. According 
to the Court, OSHA was not justified in setting the most stringent 
standard economically and technologically feasible because the only 
evidence presented by the Secretary, and the only evidence in ex­
istence, was that occupational exposure to high concentrations of 
benzene causes cancer. 120 
The Court described its threshold significant risk test as one 
requiring a showing that exposure will "more likely than not" pre­
sent a significant risk of material health impairment. 121 The Court, 
asserting that Congress intended OSHA to bear the burden of 
proving the need for a proposed standard, indicated that the Secre­
tary had not even attempted to carry this burden of proof 122 The 
113. [d. 
114. [d. at 2863. 
115. [d. at 2858. 
116. [d. at 2860. 
117. [d. at 2861. 
118. [d. 
119. [d. at 2860-61. 
120. [d. at 2869 n.60. 
121. [d. at 2869. 
122. [d. at 2870. 
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majority did not "express any opinion on the more difficult ques­
tion of what factual determinations would warrant a conclusion that 
significant risks are present which make promulgation of a new 
standard reasonably necessary or appropriate. "123 This responsibil­
ity was left to the Secretary. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting sharply, foresaw an unfortunate 
consequence to the majority's industry-protecting decision: it would 
substantially impair the government's efforts to protect workers 
from cancer and other diseases. 124 Justice Marshall felt that the 
majority had imposed its own regulatory policy, which had no basis 
in the Act, upon American workers.125 According to the dissent, 
substantial evidence supported the Secretary's lowering of the per­
missible exposure level. Justice Marshall attacked the majority 
opinion as "extraordinarily arrogant and extraordinarily unfair. "126 
He felt that, in light of the uncertainty and technical complexity of 
the issues and evidence, the Secretary's decision was reasonable 
and furthered OSHA's statutory objective of setting the standard 
"which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible . . . that no 
employee will suffer material impairment of health...."127 The 
dissent, unlike the majority, did not insist upon an initial showing 
that the health risk in question was "more likely than not" signifi­
cant or that the Secretary's standard was "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate." Justice Marshall, instead, felt that the "reasonably 
necessary or appropriate" language of section 652(8) was merely a 
general requirement that "regulatory actions must bear a reason­
able relation to those statutory purposes set forth in the statute's 
substantive provisions. "128 The Secretary's actions, according to the 
dissent, bore a reasonable relation to OSHA's statutory purpose 
and therefore should have been upheld. 129 
Justice Marshall felt that the Court was usurping Congress's 
decisionmaking authority by creating its own "significant risk" re­
quirement. 130 Congress, had it so desired, could have prevented 
the Secretary from taking regulatory action until scientific evidence 
proved that a risk was significant. Congress, however, had chosen 
123. Id. at 2872. 
124. Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 2890. 
127. 29 U.S.C. § 655{b){5) (1976). 
128. 100 S. Ct. at 2897. 
129. Id. at 2900. 
130. Id. at 2899. 
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not to do SO.131 In prescribing this significant risk test the majority 
had misconstrued the language and legislative history of the Act. 
According to Justice Marshall, the majority's test had no basis in 
the Act. 
C. The Supreme Court and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Even though the Benzene majority reserved comment as to 
the propriety of incorporating a cost-benefit test into the Act, 132 
dicta in the concurring and dissenting opinions alludes to the 
Court's views on this issue. Justice Powell, in his concurring opin­
ion, concluded that section 655(b)(5) "requires the agency to deter­
mine that the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable re­
lationship to the expected benefits."133 Justice Powell also stated 
that a health standard which involves costs disproportionate to ex­
pected benefits is neither "reasonably necessary" nor "feasible. "134 
OSHA's contention that the Secretary must set the most protective 
standard capable of achievement was dismissed by reference to 
the Act's legislative history.135 The Congress, according to Justice 
Powell, intended that OSHA balance workers' health against indus­
try's need for freedom from undue interference. 136 Reducing every 
significant health risk without regard to cost would result in a 
misallocation of resources. Industry's coffers would be depleted by 
expenditures for safety measures producing only speculative bene­
fitS.137 Justice Powell found it intolerable that OSHA, without 
presenting any documentation, had simply announced its finding 
that the benefits expected to be derived from a 1 ppm exposure 
level justified the proposed costs. 138 
Justice Marshall disagreed with Justice Powell's position on 
the cost-benefit issue. He rejected API's argument that OSHA 
must find that "the benefits of an occupational safety and health 
standard bear a reasonable relation to its costs. "139 No support for 
this position appeared in OSHA's statutory language, structure, or 
131. Id. at 2898. 
132. See text accompanying note 114 supra. 
133. 100 S. Ct. at 2877. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 2877-78. 
136. Id. at 2877 n.5. 
137. Id. at 2878. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 2902. 
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legislative history.14o The term "feasible" is ordinarily defined as 
"achievable"; it does not mean that benefits must outweigh 
costS.141 Additionally, Justice Marshall pointed to other regulatory 
statutes in which Congress has expressly or impliedly required a 
cost-benefit test. 142 He concluded, by negative implication, that a 
cost-benefit test was never intended for OSHA. Had Congress 
wanted OSHA to balance costs against benefits, the requirement 
would have been stated explicitly in the Act as it was in other stat­
utes. 143 Justice Marshall accused the majority of exceeding its re­
viewing authority by disregarding the Act's plain meaning. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Cost-Benefit Test 
Four Supreme Court Justices and the Second, Third, and Dis­
trict of Columbia Circuits have held that no cost-benefit test need 
be performed when OSHA promulgates a health standard for a 
toxic substance. l44 OSHA, moreover, argued that section 655(b)(5) 
prohibits using such a test. OSHA cited Society of the Plastics In­
dustry,145 American Iron & Steel Institute,146 and Hodgson 147 as 
authority for extending this interpretation to the Fifth Circuit. API, 
however, felt that OSHA was authorized to promulgate only those 
standards which are "reasonably necessary or appropriate to pro­
vide safe or healthful . . . places of employment. "148 API inferred 
from the words "reasonably necessary" that OSHA, prior to 
promulgating a health or safety standard, must balance the measur­
able benefits to workers against industry's cost of compliance. API 
asserted that a cost-benefit test must be undertaken each time 
OSHA promulgates a standard in order to protect industry's finite 
resources. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 2902-03. 
142. [d. at 2898 n.27. 
143. Id. at 2903. 
144. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 
at 2902; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; Society of the Plas­
tics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1301; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. 
Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467. For the view that cost-benefit analysis may be of only lim­
ited utility in standard setting, see Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National En­
vironmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1092 (1972). 
145. 509 F.2d at 1301. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. 
146. 577 F.2d at 825. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
147. 499 F.2d at 467. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. 
148. 29 U.S.c. § 652(8) (1976). 
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OSHA, on the other hand, argued that its 1 ppm standard was 
economically and technologically feasible. The standard set the 
lowest feasible level for exposure to benzene in conformance with 
its policy in other carcinogen cases. 149 OSHA augmented its posi­
tion with persuasive evidence that no known, safe level for exposure 
to benzene existed at the time its regulation was promulgated. ISO 
1. The Fifth Circuit's Derivation of the Cost-Benefit Test 
The Fifth Circuit, which derived its cost-benefit test from the 
Consumer Product Safety Act, made a number of critical errors in 
its interpretation of the relationship between OSHA and the Safety 
Act. First, OSHA protects workers from the hazards of life­
threatening, carcinogenic chemicals. The Consumer Product Safety 
Commission protects consumers from "unreasonable risks," such as 
misleading warning signs on pool slides, which are not life threat­
ening. The role of costs is much different when a hazard is not life 
threatening because there is more flexibility to weigh the potential 
benefits against the costS. 151 No lives will be lost if an error is 
149. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. 
Ct. at 2844; American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; Society of the 
Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1301; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. 
Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467. 
150. It is generally agreed that completely safe exposure levels to many chem­
icals which induce cancer cannot presently be identified and may not exist. See 
[1970] REP. OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S AD Hoc COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF 
Low LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHEM. CARCINOGENS, reprinted in Chemicals 
and the Future of Man; Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization 
and Gov't Research of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 
180 (1971); Crump, Hoel, Langley & Peto, Fundamental Carcinogenic Processes and 
Their Implications for Low Dose Risk Assessment, 36 CANCER RESEARCH 2973 
(1976); Mantel & Schneiderman, Estimating "Safe" Levels, A Hazardous Undertak­
ing, 35 CANCER RESEARCH 1379 (1975). See also the discussion and sources cited in 
OSHA, Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a 
Potential Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148, 54,165-67 (1977); Cornfield, 
Carcinogenic Risk Assessment, 198 SCI. 693 (1977). 
151. See Continental Can Co., [1976-1977] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. 
(CCH) ~ 21,009, at 25,254 (Occup'l Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 1976). In two 
recent cases the Review Commission used a cost-benefit approach in determining 
the economic feasibility of the noise level standard. Castle & Cooke Foods, Inc. 
[1977-1978] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,854, at 26,325 (Occup'l 
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 1977); Great Falls Tribune Co., [1977-1978] 
OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,844, at 26,303 (Occup'l Safety & 
Health Review Comm'n, 1977). In Castle & Cooke Foods, the Commission found 
that it would cost $3,100 per employee for implementation of the noise control plus 
$1,100 per employee maintenance cost per year. The benefits from this program 
would be a slight reduction of hearing loss by approximately 12 employees. The 
Commission held that, "On balance we think that the benefits to be gained do not 
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committed. In addition, the Safety Act's nontoxic standards should 
have to meet a tougher test than OSHA standards in order to be­
come law because their effectiveness can be demonstrated much 
more easily than OSHA standards. Indeed, the legislative history 
of the Safety Act specifies that costs to consumers in the form of in­
creased product prices, decreased availability, or reduced product 
usefulness are to be considered in the promulgation of safety 
standards. 152 Nothing in OSHA's legislative history indicates that 
such restrictive criteria should be considered in the setting of its 
safety and health standards. 
The Fifth Circuit also erred in deriving a cost-benefit test from 
the words "reasonably necessary."153 A closer look at the Aqua 
Slide opinion reveals that the cost-benefit test required in that case 
evolved from the words "unreasonable risk. "154 The Aqua Slide 
court adopted the Federal Hazardous Substances Act's155 definition 
of "unreasonable risk"156 which called for "a balancing test like that 
familiar in tort law."157 The House Committee Report on the Con­
sumer Product Safety Act158 emphasized the need for a cost-benefit 
analysis when it pointed out that: "[o]f course, no standard would 
be expected to impose added costs or inconvenience to the con­
sumer unless there is reasonable assurance that the frequency or 
severity of injuries or illnesses will be reduced. "159 Congress 
clearly intended to impose the cost-benefit balancing requirement 
on the Safety Commission when promulgating consumer product 
safety standards. In contrast, the Javits Amendment160 to OSHA 
justify the cost of the controls and that engineering controls are therefore not eco­
nomically feasible." [1977-1978) OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,844, 
at 26,331 (Occup'l Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 1977). 
152. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 
at 839. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 835, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 33, reprinted in [1972) 3 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4573, 4605 §§ 9(c)(1)(C), (c)(2)(A). 
153. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 502. 
154. The Supreme Court dissent in the Benzene Case pointed out that some 
courts interpret the term "unreasonable risk" to require a balancing of costs and ben­
efits. 100 S. Ct. at 2898 n.27 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1261(8) (1976). 
156. This definition was espoused in Forrester v. Consumer Prod. Safety 
Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
157. Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 
839. 
158. H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1972), cited in Aqua Slide 'N' 
Dive Corp. V. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 839. 
159. Id. 
160. See note 48 supra. 
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added only a feasibility test for toxic substance standards. It did not 
mention a cost-benefit test. 
2. Supreme Court's Treatment of the Cost-Benefit Issue 
It is apparent from dicta in the Ben::.ene Case that the Court 
essentially was faced with a question of statutory interpretation. 
Justice Powell and Justice Marshall reached differing conclusions 
regarding a cost-benefit balancing test in the OSHA statute. The 
existence of legislative history supporting either interpretation 
caused this conflict. Unfortunately, Congress used the feasibility 
language in section 655(b)(5) in many contexts but never ade­
quately defined it. 
Justice Powell supported the cost-benefit requirement because 
of the detrimental economic effects which he perceived would re­
sult if no cost-benefit test existed. He posited that, if OSHA ig­
nored economic considerations in setting health and safety 
standards, a serious misallocation of financial resources would re­
sult. Industry would be forced to spend great sums of money to 
achieve a disproportionately small amount of benefit. lSI If the Sec­
retary is permitted to promulgate health and safety standards that 
massively dislocate industries, their ability to remedy dangerous 
conditions which are discovered in the future will be severely im­
paired. 
Justice Powell, however, did not recognize that each toxic sub­
stance health standard promulgated would affect a different indus­
try. A given industry nonnally will be required to take protective 
action against only a small number of toxic health risks, and many 
of these risks can be remedied simply by substituting one sub­
stance for another. Exposure to substances which have no adequate 
substitute may be lessened by technological and engineering proce­
dures. Annual costs will be comparatively small after initial installa­
tion of the new protective devices. Most industries dealing with 
the use or manufacture of carcinogenic substances are multibillion­
dollar industries which can afford a multimillion-dollar expense for 
protective measures. 
In the instant case, the rubber and petroleum industries 
would be most affected by the benzene standard. The cost of com­
pliance, which OSHA estimated at approximately one-half billion 
dollars, though significant, is readily affordable by either industry. 
161. 100 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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It must be emphasized that entire industries with extensive financial 
resources will be forced to bear these expenses, not single corpora­
tions. These financial resources also are renewed annually through 
continued operation of the industry. 
Justice Powell's opinion reflected concern for the financial 
health of American industry. By interpreting a "reasonably neces­
sary"162 health standard as one which does not require expendi­
tures wholly disproportionate to the expected benefits, Justice 
Powell protected industry from costs to implement safety devices 
to reduce exposure to toxic substances. Since science cannot yet 
quantify the adverse health effects from low-level exposure to most 
carcinogens, the benefits from reduced exposure will always be 
outweighed by the compliance costs associated with a toxic sub­
stance standard. If Congress had intended this result when it en­
acted OSHA, it surely would have stated explicitly that costs must 
be balanced against benefits as it has in other regulatory stat­
utes. 163 The view which Justice Powell adopted sacrifices the 
health of American workers for the pursuit of profits by industry. 
This approach forces the Secretary to place a monetary value upon 
a human life to enable him to determine at what point the benefits 
of a health standard outweigh its costs. Congress did not intend 
such a procedure. On the contrary, Congress could not have ex­
pressed its intent to protect workers' health more clearly. The toxic 
substance section of OSHA requires the Secretary to set a standard 
"which most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer 
material impairment of health. "164 The dissent interpreted this sec­
tion differently than Justice Powell did, rejecting Justice Powell's 
stance. 
Justice Marshall viewed the cost-benefit question very simply. 
He stated that judicial inquiry must end when legislative intent 
162. See 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). 
163. See Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976); Clean Water Act, 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(I)(B) (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(I) (1976). See 
also Energy Policy & Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6295(a)(4)(D) (1976); Outer Con­
tinental Shelf Land Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(I) (1976). Congress has also required a 
balance between costs and benefits when it uses the term "unreasonable risk." See, 
e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976) (interpreted by 
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d at 831); 
Child Protection & Toy Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261(s) (1976) (interpreted by 
Forrester v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 559 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
164. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
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and statutory language are clear. 16s He could not find any support 
for a cost-benefit balancing test in either of these sources and 
would not twist the plain language of the Act in order to Imply 
such a test. Justice Marshall found no ambiguity in the term "feasi­
ble" as it is used in section 655(b)(5) of the Act. By ordinary defini­
tion, an activity is feasible if it is achievable. 166 This definition, 
coupled with the congressional interpretation and utilization of the 
term in other regulatory statutes,167 led Justice Marshall to con­
clude that no such cost-benefit analysis was ever intended. 
Justice Marshall was correct in holding that the legislative in­
tent behind OSHA was protection of workers' health to the extent 
that it is economically and technologically achievable. The Secre­
tary is constrained by an industry's economic status only in cases 
where regulations threaten to cause "massive economic disloca­
tion"168 of the affected industry. Since the entire OSHA statute 
represents a congressional decision to "assure ... every working 
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi­
tions, "169 any costs imposed by federal health and safety standards 
must be regarded as reasonable and necessary costs of doing busi­
ness. These costs ultimately will be passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices for certain goods, but this is a small price to 
pay for improving the health of American laborers. 
The dissent did not force an unintended meaning onto the 
Act. If the results of an interpretation precluding a cost-benefit test 
are destructive to industry, Justice Marshall realized that Congress 
would remedy the situation. Should American industries become 
incapable of competing with foreign businesses due to the crippling 
costs of compliance with OSHA regulations, Congress should step 
in and take appropriate action. For now, however, Congress has 
chosen not to balance workers' health against industries' dollars, 
thereby avoiding the indirect valuation of human life. Until Con­
gress wishes to adopt a cost-benefit test, the judiciary should not 
impose its own ideas of social policy upon the nation. Justice 
Marshall's view should control when the cost-benefit issue finally 
arrives squarely before the Court. 
165. 100 S. Ct. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153 (1978)). 
166. Id. at 2902-03. 
167. See note 163 supra. 
168. See AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 123. 
169. 29 U.S.C. § 651{a) (1976). 
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3. The Proper Test-No Balancing 
The proper test for a section 655(b)(5) toxic standard involves 
no balancing at all. The first prong of the test requires measure­
ment of the anticipated compliance costs. Only if costs become 
prohibitively expensive or cause a massive dislocation17o of the af­
fected industry will a standard be economically infeasible. The sec­
ond prong of the test determines whether a regulation is techno­
logically feasible. Technology which is "on the frontiers of scientific 
knowledge"l71 or which "looms on today's horizon"172 is technologi­
cally feasible. These two prongs are the culmination of pre-Benzene 
decisions173 involving regulations dealing with toxic substances. 
This interpretation of feasibility is further refined by contrasting 
the toxic substances decisions with the large number of cases 
arising under the general nontoxic substance standards. of section 
655(a), which has been interpreted to expressly require a cost­
benefit test. 174 If Congress wanted toxic substance standards to 
pass a cost-benefit test in order to be feasible, it would undoubt­
edly have included language to that effect in section 655(b) (5). 
Two decisions have mandated a cost-benefit analysis for 
standards dealing with nontoxic section 655(a) health and safety 
standards. Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor175 and RMI Co. v. 
Secretary of Labor176 are factually similar cases dealing with re­
170. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; AFL-CIO v. 
Brennan, 530 F.2d at 109; Society ofthe Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1301. 
171. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467 (emphasis 
added). 
172. AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d at 121 (emphasis added). 
173. See text accompanying notes 53, 61, 73 & 83 supra. 
174. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 835-37; U.P.S. of Ohio, 
Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 570 F.2d 806,811-12 (8th Cir. 
1978); Turner Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977); I.T.O., Corp. v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976); At­
lantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 534 
F.2d 541, 548, 555 (3d Cir. 1976); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1976); Industrial 
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477; Atlantic Steel Co., [1977-78] 
OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 22,483 (1978); Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 
[1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 22,261 (1977); Castle & Cooke 
Foods, Inc., [1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,854 (1977); 
Great Falls Tribune Co., [1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 
21,844 (1977); West Point Pepperell, Inc., [1977-78] OCCUP'L SAFETY & HEALTH 
DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,751 (1977); Continental Can Co., [1976-77] OCCUP'L SAFETY & 
HEALTH DEC. (CCH) ~ 21,009 (1976). 
175. 561 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1977). 
176. 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979). 
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quirements that the industries adopt "feasible administrative or en­
gineering controls. "177 The Sixth Circuit in RMI, citing Turner, 178 
concluded that the OSHA standard in question should be inter­
preted to require those engineering and administrative controls 
which were economically, as well as technologically, feasible. Con­
trols were found to be economically feasible even though they 
were expensive and increased production costS. 179 These controls, 
however, were not required without regard to the costs which had 
to be incurred and the benefits expected to be achieved. 180 In ap­
proving a cost-benefit analysis, the RMI court asserted that "the 
benefits to employees should weigh heavier on the scale than the 
costs to employers. "181 When the benefits are found to justify the 
costs, the standard is feasible. 
As Turner and RMI indicate, the circ~it courts require strict 
cost-benefit tests for nontoxic section 655(a) health and safety 
standards. The Fifth Circuit acquiesced in API's arguments and 
applied this cost-benefit test to toxic standards under section 
655(b)(5).182 In other carcinogen cases183 not a single court even 
hinted that the rigid cost-benefit analysis applicable to section 
655(a) standards should be used for section 655(b)(5) standards. The 
implication is that toxic and nontoxic substances standards are 
distinctly different and should be judged by different criteria. The 
Fifth Circuit was the first to carry the section 655(a) test into the 
realm of section 655(b)(5). The court appears to have broadened 
use of the cost-benefit test without justification. 
B. Substantial Evidence Test 
Even if the Fifth Circuit's cost-benefit test had been applica­
ble, OSHA's alternative argument, that substantial evidence sup­
177. 29 C.F.R. § 191O.95(b)(I) (1979). 
178. 594 F.2d at 572. 
179. See Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Re­
view Comm'n, 529 F.2d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 1976); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO 
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477. 
180. 594 F.2d at 572. 
181. Id. 
182. Criticism of this view can be found in Berger & Riskin, supra note 47, at 
340. The authors argue that Congress did not intend a "feasibility" requirement for a 
§ 655(a) noise standard. Instead, they believe that feasibility applies only to § 
655(b)(5) standards. When hazards are not life threatening, no cost-benefit approach 
should be used. Id. 
183. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 825; AFL-CIO v. 
Brennan, 530 F.2d at 109; Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc., v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 
1301. 
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ported its 1 ppm standard, should have prevailed. Because of the 
inconclusive nature of the evidence presented by both sides, and 
more importantly, because of the less demanding standard of judi­
cial review which the courts apply to the Secretary's legislative like 
policy judgments, the court should have ruled in OSHA's favor. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizes courts to 
review OSHA regulations by a "substantial evidence" standard. 184 
This test is met if such relevant evidence exists which a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.185 Judicial 
review of informal decisionmaking is difficult because the adminis­
trative record contains a mixture of legislative like policy judgments 
and factual determinations. 18s Courts generally use an "arbitrary 
and capricious"187 standard for review of legislative determinations 
and determinations based on unresolved issues of fact. A substan­
tial evidence test, however, is employed for factual determina­
tions. 188 
184. "The determinations of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by 
substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976), 
construed in Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1157 
(3d Cir. 1974). The Senate originally intended to provide quick and flexible develop­
ment and revisions of occupational safety and health standards through informal 
rulemaking. The House, however, wanted to require rulemaking on the record. 
Section 655(f) was the result. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 
473; Associated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d at 
348-49. See generally Note, Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety & 
Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test As Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 
1974 DUKE L.J. 459. 
185. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Consolidated Edison Co. v. 
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Lisefski v. Weinberger, 403 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D. Pa. 
1975); Tibbs v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Ky. 1975); Blackmon v. 
Weinberger, 400 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Wedlow v. Weinberger, 399 F. 
Supp. 1215 (E.D. Okla. 1975). 
186. See Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 
1158-60 (3d Cir.), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975); Indus. Union Dep't, AFL­
CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 472-76; Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of 
Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 127-29 (5th Cir. 1974); Associated Indus. of New York State, 
Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 (2d Cir. 1973). 
187. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). The "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard is the normal standard applied to informal agency rulemaking. 
188. Noranda Aluminum, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm'n, 593 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1979); Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 593 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 
436 (1979); Southern Colo. Prestress Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm'n, 586 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1978); B & B Insulation, Inc. v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978); Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 542 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Society of the Plastics Indus. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1304; Synthetic Organic Chern. 
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 886 
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Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson 189 is the 
leading case regarding judicial review of OSHA standards. 190 In 
that case, the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the Sec­
retary will not always be able to make decisions on the basis of 
undisputed fact. It would not be fair for courts to apply the same 
standard of review to regulations based on disputed as well as 
undisputed facts. The Hodgson court reasoned that "when the Sec­
retary is obliged to make policy judgments where no factual cer­
tainties exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he 
should so state and go on to identify the considerations he found 
persuasive: "191 The court indicated that it should be flexible in re­
viewing standards promulgated without the benefit of proven facts. 
Conclusive information is sometimes simply unavailable to the 
agency. The Fifth Circuit, however, did not follow Hodgson but in­
stead devised its own standard of review. 
The Fifth Circuit followed the majority of circuits in adopting 
the "substantial evidence" standard of review for factual determina­
tions. 192 The standard of review for policy determinations, how­
(1974); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477. Contra, Asso­
ciated Indus. of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-50 
(2d Cir. 1973), in which Judge Friendly made the first use of the substantial evi­
dence test and held that all findings of fact and policy must be supported by substan­
tial evidence. He believed that in a § 655(0 standard of judicial review, the legisla­
tive history of the Act does not point to the use of anything but this substantial 
evidence standard. Id. at 349. See S. REP. No. 1282, supra note 34, at 5192; Annat., 
25 A.L.R. Fed. 134, 141 (1975) (citing The Job Safety and Health Act of 1970, (1971) 
OPERATIONS MANUAL (BNA) 129). This approach has proved to be unworkable. See 
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 467. 
189. Id. at 472-76. 
190. The court in Synthetic Organic Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 
1155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1974), which followed the Hodgson ration­
ale, explicitly set forth the components of judicial review of OSHA standards, and re­
quired the following determinations: (1) Whether the Secretary's notice of proposed 
rulemaking adequately informed interested persons of the action taken; (2) whether 
the Secretary adequately set forth reasons for his action; (3) whether the statement of 
reasons reflected consideration of factors relevant under the statute; (4) whether 
presently available alternatives were at least considered; and (5) if the Secretary's 
determination is based in whole or in part on factual matters subject to evidentiary 
development, whether substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole sup­
ports the determination. Id. at 1160. There is some controversy as to whether Syn­
thetic Organic does, in fact, follow Hodgson or Associated Industries. Compare 
Annot., 25 A.L.R. Fed. 150, 158 (1975) (follows Associated Industries rationale) with 
Taylor, supra note 72, at 227 (follows Hodgson rationale but articulated differently). 
191. 499 F.2d at 476. 
192. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th 
Cir. 1974). 
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ever, consisted of an inquiry into "whether the Secretary carried 
out his essentially legislative task in a manner reasonable under the 
state of the 'record before him,"193 
The record shows that OSHA believed the benefits of its 1 
ppm standard would be "appreciable, "194 This conclusion was 
based on the only two facts known to the agency: Benzene is a car­
cinogen; and no safe exposure level to benzene was known to exist, 
OSHA also assumed that exposure to a low level of a toxic sub­
stance would necessarily be safer than exposure to a high level. 
These were the most persuasive facts the Secretary could offer in 
support of his 1 ppm standard, Scientific evidence linked benzene 
to leukemia but at exposure levels higher than 10 ppm, the per­
missible level prior to the promulgation of the Secretary's disputed 
standard. 195 The highly persuasive Infante study,196 which demon­
strated a fivefold increase in the risk of death from leukemia due to 
benzene exposure, could not establish that a 1 ppm exposure level 
would be safer than a 10 ppm level. 197 Even tests with laboratory 
animals were inconclusive,198 The Fifth Circuit desired some evi­
dence comparing the effects of exposure to high doses of carcino­
gens to the effects from low doses, The court even suggested that 
OSHA chart a dose-response curve199 to reasonably project the ef­
193. [d. at 129. 
194. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 503. 
195. In fact, there is no evide~ce that links benzene to leukemia at the 10 ppm 
level, which has been the standard since 1971. 
196. See note 9 supra. 
197. This is because no exposure levels were ever measured when the actual 
exposures occurred. 100 S. Ct. at 2893 n.17. 
198. Scientists have yet to conclusively establish that exposure to benzene 
causes leukemia in animals. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979). Studies on humans 
linking benzene to leukemia conclusively rebut any suggestion of a lack of toxicity. 
See notes 9 & 10 supra and accompanying text. 
199. 581 F.2d at 504-05. "A dose-response curve shows the relationship be­
tween different exposure levels and the risk of cancer associated with those exposure 
levels. Generally, exposure to higher levels carries with it a higher risk, and expo­
sure to lower levels is accompanied by a reduced risk." Id. at 504 n.24. OSHA had 
explicitly addressed the possibility of establishing an approximate dose-response 
curve based upon human exposure data and had concluded that evidence on worker 
exposure was insufficient to establish such a curve: 
[Ilt is OSHA's view following a careful review of the record that, at the 
present time, it is impossible to derive any conclusions regarding dose­
response relationships for benzene beyond the general observation that 
higher exposure levels carry a greater risk than do lower exposure levels. 
What is apparent, however, is that a decrease in exposure level and/or dura­
tion will result in decreased risk of leukemia. 
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979). The court did not fault this conclusion. It merely held 
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fect of low-level exposure to benzene. The court wanted OSHA to 
"make rough but educated estimates . . . of the benefits expected 
from reducing the permissible exposure level" in order to deter­
mine whether these benefits200 bore a "reasonable relationship" to 
the costs imposed. 201 
The circuit court was asking OSHA to perform a test that was 
not capable of performance. Medical science could not supply the 
approximations which the court demanded because there was very 
little information available showing which exposure levels to ben­
zene concentrations caused detrimental health effects. 202 Testing 
also was complicated by leukemia's long latency period. Leukemia 
does not become manifest until many years after exposure to a 
leukemogen. A test performed at the 10 ppm level must extend 
over decades until the effects of exposure are discovered. More 
workers, therefore, will have to contract leukemia before OSHA 
can act. 203 Studying workers who already have been exposed to 
that without more data OSHA could not order the lowering of human exposure to 
benzene. 581 F.2d at 505. 
200. ld. at 504. 
201. ld. 
202. Even when available data are sufficiently reliable to permit the accurate 
prediction of a standard's probable health benefits, using cost-benefit criteria to set 
an exposure standard creates problems. Setting a "feasible" exposure limit and 
reducing the risk to employees more directly is the preferable approach. First, the 
greatest difficulty in setting a higher-than-feasible exposure level using cost-benefit 
techniques is placing an economic value, implicit or explicit, on life, health, bereave­
ment, pain and suffering, and other consequences of occupational disease and death. 
There is no generally accepted method for valuing such considerations, even implic­
itly. See Kramer, Economics, Technology and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 6 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 161, 165 (1976). For a discussion of the various methods occasionally 
proposed to quantify the value of life and other intangibles, see 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742, 
46,751 (1976). See generally Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1415 (1969); 
Rhoads & Singer, What is Life Worth?, 51 PUB. INTEREST 74 (1978). Second, there is 
no general agreement concerning whether a stream of health benefits and saved 
lives extending into the future should be discounted to present value in the same 
way that future economic values are generally discounted in awarding tort damages. 
Third, the Secretary has found that industry tends to overestimate the cost of imple­
menting proposed standards, which makes it difficult to accurately weigh benefits 
against costs. For example, industry critics asserted that the Secretary's vinyl chlo­
ride standard would seriously disrupt business. Nevertheless, the industry promptly 
complied, at a cost much lower than it had projected, by devising new technology to 
meet the standard. Vinyl chloride production has continued to increase. See Doniger, 
Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of 
Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497 (1978). 
203. It would be impossible to perform a test at a 10 ppm exposure level on 
laboratory animals. Such a test would require the exposure to benzene of thousands 
of animals who might not survive the test. This is in addition to the difficulties dis­
cussed at note 202 supra. See also McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion 
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benzene does not provide OSHA with any useful data because 
there is no way to accurately measure the workers' initial exposure 
level. This situation is worsened because original records may be 
nonexistent or difficult to locate. Workers who have moved from 
job to job may have been exposed to numerous carcinogens at dif­
ferent levels, further impairing the accuracy of any test results. 
The Secretary has the burden of demonstrating the need to 
protect workers from "material impairment of health or functional 
capacity."204 The Secretary, however, may make a policy judgment 
when promulgating a health regulation in an area not susceptible to 
proof.205 In carcinogen regulation cases where neither party can 
prove its contentions conclusively, the court should defer to the 
Secretary's judgment. As in American Iron & Steel Institute, 206 
once a cause and effect relationship between a harzardous sub­
stance and a disease is established, the burden of proof should shift 
to the industry to show that a reduction will not result in safer 
working conditions. 
Had the Fifth Circuit truly been using the Florida Peach 
Growers Association v. Department of Labor207 "substantial evi­
dence" standard for legislative like policy judgments, it would have 
. recognized that the Secretary carried out his task in a reasonable 
208manner consistent with the Act's language and purpose. Unfor­
tunately, the Supreme Court majority agreed with the circuit court 
on this point. In doing so, the Court seriously curtailed the Secre­
tary's authority to use his judgment and to take preventive action 
when regulating exposure to toxic substances. 
C. The Supreme Court Majority's New Test 
The Supreme Court majority held that the Secretary's toxic 
substances standards must pass a two-part test before they take ef­
fect. The Secretary, before setting a new, lower exposure level, 
must make a threshold finding that the current exposure level in a 
workplace presents a significant risk of harm to employee health. 
The second part of the test, dealing with the need for a cost­
benefit test, was not discussed since the Secretary' had failed to 
in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens 
in EPA and OSHA, 67 CEO. L.J. 729, 806 (1979). 
204. Occupational Safety & Health Act, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
205. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 833. 
206. Id. 
207. 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974). 
208. 581 F.2d at 497. 
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demonstrate that exposure at lO ppm presented a significant health 
risk. 
The majority derived its significant risk test primarily from the 
Act's definition of an occupational safety and health standard. The 
Secretary can only enact standards which are "reasonably necessary 
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful [workplaces]. . . . "209 
The Court grafted this definition onto the section 655(b)(5) require­
ment that health or safety standards be feasible. The Court's new 
test requires the Secretary to determine that a health standard is 
reasonably necessary or appropriate before it can be considered 
feasible under section 655(b)(5).210 An OSHA standard is consid­
ered reasonably necessary when a significant health risk rendering 
a workplace unsafe can be corrected by a change in industry prac­
tices. 
OSHA's benzene standard was not reasonably necessary or ap­
propriate because the Secretary had not proven that a significant 
health risk existed at a lO ppm exposure level to benzene. 211 
OSHA had merely assumed that some risk must exist at lO ppm 
because benzene was a proven leukemogen and no safe level of ex­
posure could be established. OSHA presented no concrete evi­
dence that a significant risk was presented to employee health at 
the lO ppm level. The Fifth Circuit's decision to overrule the 1 
ppm standard was affirmed because the Secretary had exceeded his 
statutory authority in promulgating a health standard not demon­
strated to be reasonably necessary or appropriate. 212 
The majority seriously eroded OSHA's ability to regulate 
workplaces where toxic substances are present. The Court created 
a threshold significant risk test yet gave the Secretary only vague 
guidelines as to what constitutes a significant risk. The Court's ex­
amples of risks at either extreme do not materially assist the Secre­
tary in making his determination. 213 
The Court looked to OSHA's rulings on other carcinogens to 
show that OSHA had used risk-quantifying measures in the past. 214 
209. 29 U.S.c. § 652(8) (1976). 
210. 100 S. Ct. at 2850. 
211. [d. at 2855. 
212. [d. at 2872-73. 
213. The majority cited a one in a billion chance of dying from cancer by drink­
ing chlorinated water as an insignificant risk, and a one in a thousand chance of dy­
ing from inhalation of gasoline vapors as a risk which "a reasonable person might 
well consider ... significant and take appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate it." 
Id. at 2871. 
214. [d. at 2871-72. 
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The Court felt that these tests also could be used to measure the 
effects of exposure to benzene. The risk-quantifying measures, 
however, usually consisted of reports of actual human deaths and 
estimates of fatalities likely to result without quick corrective ac­
tion. 215 In the Benzene Case, the Secretary could not quantifY the 
number of lives which would be saved by the 1 ppm standard but 
could only estimate that the benefits would be appreciable. 216 The 
Supreme Court majority did not accept this estimation as proof of a 
significant risk. The Court implied, from the kind of evidence it 
considered necessary to establish a Significant risk, that OSHA 
must wait for deaths to occur before the agency can prove that a 
toxic substance health standard is necessary. 
In the Benzene Case, OSHA, for the first time in a carcinogen 
regulation case, could not estimate the number of deaths which 
had occured, or which would occur, if an existing exposure level 
were not reduced. The benzene standard was truly an example of 
preventive action by the Secretary of Labor. The effects of low­
level exposure to a proven carcinogen were uncertain, but tests 
performed at slightly higher than 10 ppm exposure levels were 
known to cause leukemia. The Secretary took immediate action in­
stead of waiting for more conclusive evidence in the form of more 
deaths. The majority, by holding that the Secretary had exceeded 
his authority, undermined the Secretary's ability to make the pol­
icy judgments which section 655(b)(5) of the Act empowe,rs him to 
make. Because of inadequate scientific testing procedures, deaths 
must occur before the Secretary can comply with his statutory duty 
to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent 
feasible, . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of 
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular ex­
posure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of 
his working life. "217 
VI. ALTERNATIVES 
Both the Fifth Circuit .and the United States Supreme Court 
found the rationale behind OSHA's 1 ppm standard to be inade­
quate to justifY the regulation. Both courts, however, could have 
215. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d at 831 (coke oven 
emissions); Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1305 (vinyl 
chloride); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 471 (asbestos 
dust). 
216. 100 S. Ct. at 2870. 
217. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
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upheld OSHA's benzene standard by following persuasive decisions 
from other circuits and could have saved an unknown number of 
workers from potentially fatal consequences. 
The Third Circuit considered a fact situation similar to that 
arising in the Benzene Case in American Iron & Steel Institute v. 
OSHA,218 which dealt with the validity of a standard lowering the 
exposure level to coke oven emissions. 219 The Secretary of Labor 
had conclusively determined that coke oven emissions were 
carcinogenic. 22o The mortality rate among employees working on 
coke oven batteries for five or more years was ten times greater 
than normal, and the incidence of various nonmalignant respiratory 
diseases was also substantially above average. The Secretary's Advi­
sory Committee found that "Since coke oven emissions are 
carcinogenic and there is no scientific data to demonstrate that 
there is a safe level of exposure to carcinogens, the basis of this 
standard must be 'no exposure.' "221 
In affirming the lower permissible exposure level, the Ameri­
can Iron & Steel Institute court held that the Secretary had pre­
sented substantial evidence to support his effort to meet a per­
ceived health need. The court also stated that "the Secretary is 
constrained by the requirement of feasibility, both technological 
and economic, "222 when setting the lowest permissible exposure 
level. The court did not find any cost-benefit test hidden in the 
Act, nor did the court attempt to graft such a test onto the Act. 
Since the standard was economically and technologically capable of 
performance, the court found that the requirements of section 
655(b)(5) were met. 223 
The Third Circuit, in American Iron & Steel Institute, inter­
preted section 655(b)(5) of the Act properly. The court accepted 
OSHA's conclusion that no safe level of exposure existed and then 
shifted the burden to plaintiffs to prove otherwise. The Secretary, 
in the Benzene Case, had difficulty in justifying his regulation to 
the Fifth Circuit because the court refused to shift the burden of 
proof to API even after the Secretary had shown, by substantial ev­
218. 577 F.2d at 825. 
219. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (1976) (adding 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029). 
220. 577 F.2d at 831. " '[T]here is overwhelming scientific evidence that coke 
oven emissions are carcinogenic,' ... hence, 'the ambient atmosphere of coke ovens 
is a carcinogen rich environment.' " Id. 
221. Id. at 832 n.7. A level of zero exposure could not be set because some of 
the substance is present naturally in the environment and cannot be removed. Id. 
222. Id. at 832. 
223. Id. at 835,837. 
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idence, that benzene exposure caused leukemia. The Third Circuit, 
on the other hand, correctly allowed the Secretary's policy judg­
ment to stand without requiring an impossible showing of benefits 
in the form of lives saved. The court recognized that substantial 
compliance costs would be imposed on the industry; nevertheless, 
the Third Circuit considered that saving lives in the future was of 
utmost priority. 224 
Another carcinogen exposure case in the Second Circuit, Soci­
ety of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA,225 dealt with vinyl chlo­
ride and polyvinyl chloride exposures. The Secretary again deter­
mined that vinyl chloride and polyvinyl chloride were carcinogens 
and that a safe level of exposure for humans could not be deter­
mined. There was, however, conclusive proof that thirteen workers 
had died from exposure to these substances and that cancerous tu­
mors had formed in laboratory animals at a 250 ppm exposure 
level. 226 No evidence whatsoever showed that exposure to levels 
below 50 ppm would cause cancer in, or even be unsafe for, hu­
mans. 
The Second Circuit upheld the new 1 ppm standard and found 
that substantial evidence justified the lower exposure level. 227 The 
court dismissed the very same "no proof of lives saved" argument 
that API made in the Benzene Case228 by stating: "it must be re­
membered that we are dealing here with human lives, and the re­
cord reveals that ... [thirteen] workers have already died from 
this potent chemical."229 The Second Circuit also accepted the Sec­
retary's determination that no safe level of exposure to vinyl chlo­
ride and polyvinyl chloride existed and shifted the burden of proof 
to petitioners to prove otherwise, just as the Third Circuit had 
done in American Iron & Steel Institute. 23o The Society of the 
224. The estimated costs of compliance with this standard range from 
$240,000,000 to $1,280,000,000. The court stated "[allthough we are very sensitive to 
the financial implications of the standard and have endeavored to carefully weigh its 
effect upon the well-being of the industry, we are not persuaded that its implementa­
tion would precipitate anything approaching the 'massive dislocation' ... which 
would characterize an economically infeasible standard." ld. at 836. 
225; 509 F.2d at 1301. 
226. ld. at 1305-06. 
227. ld. at 1308. 
228. No proof exists in the record which justifies lowering the standard, since 
the medical evidence does not establish that low-level exposure to vinyl chloride 
and polyvinyl chloride is safe. ld. 
229. ld. 
230. 577 F.2d at 825. 
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Plastics Industry court found that the Secretary's duty under 
OSHA is to protect workers and to act even when health risks 
posed by a substance cannot be definitively proven. 231 
American Iron & Steel Institute and Society of the Plastics In­
dustry offered the circuit court and the Supreme Court precedent, 
but both courts inexplicably chose not to follow it. The American 
Iron & Steel Institute and Society of the Plastics Industry courts 
did not hesitate to find that the Secretary, .in lowering exposure 
levels, had performed his duty to protect workers from health haz­
ards as mandated by the Act. Yet neither case presented any more 
evidence of the effects of low-level exposure than the Benzene 
Case. Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court tried to rec­
oncile or distinguish these two cases that were virtually identical to 
the Benzene Case before them. The circuit court, instead, relied 
on Aqua Slide,232 which it interpreted improperly. The Supreme 
Court did not even allude to the division among the circuits re­
garding the quantum of evidence of health risk which must be 
found before the Secretary can promulgate a new health standard. 
Both courts exhibited an overriding concern for industrial economiC 
welfare. Their view contrasts sharply with the humanistic ap­
proaches of the Second and Third Circuits. The Fifth Circuit, in 
breaking with these other two circuits, and the Supreme Court, in 
ignoring them, tra'nsformed the Act, intended to be a protector of 
worker health and safety, into a procedure which cannot regulate 
exposure to toxic chemicals until human fatalities prove that the 
chemicals are sufficiently dangerous. 
Rather than require additional proof of benzene's fatal quali­
ties, the Supreme Court should have held that its self-imposed sig­
nificant risk test was satisfied. In the majority's view, substantial 
evidence must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that a 
significant health risk exists before the Secretary can promulgate a 
protective standard. 233 Substantial evidence has been defined as 
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade­
quate to support a conclusion."234 Judicial review under the sub­
231. 509 F.2d at 1308, 
232. See notes 95-107 supra and accompanying text. 
233. 100 S. Ct. at 2869. The Act provides for the substantial evidence test as 
the proper standard of review of the Secretary's actions. 29 U .S.C. § 655(0 (1976). 
234. Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,229 (1938), 
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stantial evidence test, however, is ultimately deferential. 235 Since 
the Court struck down OSHA's standard, the Justices must have 
-'felt that, based on the evidence presented at the administrative 
hearing, a reasonable person would not believe that a significant 
health risk more likely than not existed in workplaces where ben­
zene was present. 
The Court did not ease OSHA's burden of proof despite the 
highly technical and complicated nature of the medical evidence 
and issues presented. Such evidence is extremely difficult to inter­
pret, rendering definitive resolution practically impossible. Conclu­
sive proof of the regulation's effectiveness, then, was impossible for 
the Secretary to present. 
The Act, however, does not prevent the Secretary from taking 
action when his ultimate decision cannot be based on conclusive 
fact. Rather, the Act directs him to "set the standard ... on the 
basis of the best available evidence. . . . "236 The Secretary exam­
ined fifty volumes of exhibits and testimony containing persuasive 
evidence on both sides of the issue. Considerable evidence was 
presented which conclusively proved that exposure to benzene 
caused leukemia and other nonmalignant blood disorders at expo­
sure levels ranging from 0 to 30 ppm. 237 The Secretary was forced 
to make a decision without the benefit of conclusive evidence. No 
study could determine the effects of low-level exposure to benzene 
because the latency period for such an experiment is potentially 
twenty years. The Secretary decided that a significant health risk 
existed on the basis of the best evidence available to him. 
The Court should have deferred to the Secretary because of 
his expertise in the area of carcinogen regulation. Sufficient rele­
vant evidence existed to convince a reasonable mind that a signifi­
cant health risk was presented by continued exposure to benzene. 
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, stated that the majority 
"must recognize that the ultimate decision cannot be based solely 
on determinations of fact, and that those factual conclusions that 
have been reached are ones which the courts are ill-equipped to 
resolve on their own. "238 
The Court, in effect, held that no toxic substance can be said 
to present a significant risk to an employee's health unless some 
, 235. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971); Consolo v. 
Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 618-21 (1966). 
236. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976). 
237. 100 S. Ct. at 2892. 
238. Id. at 2896 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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measurable benefit will be derived from elimination of the sub­
stance or from a decrease in the exposure level. A precise quantifi­
cation of the benefits to be derived from the benzene standard was 
the only data which science could not supply. 'Benefits are not al­
ways capable of estimation either, especially when human lives 
must be lost in order to predict how many people can be saved by 
corrective action. 
The Benzene holding requires the Secretary to accumulate 
conclusive evidence that low-level exposure to benzene will cause 
disease, while in the interim an inestimable number of workers are 
being exposed to hazards which eventually may kill them. In light 
of the express language and intent of the Act, the Court should 
have found that the Secretary's legislativelike policy judgment re­
garding benzene was within his statutory authority and was sup­
ported by substantial evidence in the record. Had OSHA been 
able to prove that one or even a few lives would have been saved, 
it is questionable whether the Court still would have held that 
benzene presented no significant risk to employees' health. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Benzene Case raised the issue of whether the Secretary of 
Labor must balance compliance costs against expected benefits 
when he is promulgating health and safety standards for toxic sub­
stances. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the "reasonably necessary" language of section 652(8) of 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act requires the Secretary of 
Labor to balance costs against benefits. In finding that a cost­
benefit test was implied in the Act, the court misinterpreted sec­
tion 652(8). The court erred by analogizing this statutory provision 
to a similar section of the Consumer Product Safety Act, which also 
contained "reasonably necessary" language. Since the two statutes 
shared the same language and the Safety Act required a cost­
benefit test, OSHA was interpreted to require a cost-benefit test as 
well. 
The United States Supreme Court majority avoided the cost­
benefit issue by holding that the Secretary had failed its new signif­
icant risk test. Under this test, the Secretary must find a workplace 
to be unsafe due to the presence of significant risks before 
regulatory action may be taken. The Secretary also must determine 
that OSHA's regulations would reduce these risks. The Court held 
that the Secretary had not determined that a significant risk was 
more likely than not presented to workers' health by the presence 
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of 10 ppm of benzene. Since the Secretary failed the first part of 
the significant risk test, it was not necessary for the Court to reach 
the cost-benefit issue. 
Justice Marshall, dissenting, felt strongly that no cost-benefit 
test could be inferred from the plain language of the Act. Since 
Congress had expressly included a cost-benefit test in other reg­
ulatory statutes, Congress's failure to include such a test in OSHA 
evinced its intent not to require the test. Justice Marshall stated 
that the majority's new significant risk test had no basis in the Act. 
He felt that the majority's test was not related to the intent ex­
pressed by Congress in enacting OSHA and reflected the majority's 
own notions of proper regulatory policy. 
A more desirable test for section 655(b)(5) toxic substance 
standards would determine whether the standards are economically 
and technologically achievable. The Second and Third Circuits now 
use this test, and section 655(b)(5) authorizes it. Both circuits have 
upheld decisions by the Secretary to decrease carcinogen exposure 
levels upon mere findings that the standards were economically 
and technologically achievable .. 
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court could have 
found solid precedent in American Iron & Steel Institute v. 
OSHA239 and Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA240 to 
uphold OSHA's 1 ppm standard. Instead, both courts embarked on 
a lives-versus-dollars analysis of the Secretary's legislativelike policy 
decision. The Fifth Circuit demanded definitive medical proof that 
some lives would be saved by a decreased benzene exposure level, 
but this evidence simply was unavailable. The evidence demanded 
by the Fifth Circuit essentially required that more workers die be­
fore the link between low-level exposure to benzene and leukemia 
could be established. 
The Supreme Court effected the same result by imposing a 
significant risk test upon OSHA. Previous cases illustrate' that the 
only way to show a significant risk is to supply the court with a 
death count. The Supreme Court, in holding that substantial evi­
dence did not prove that a significant risk more likely than not was 
presented to employee health by continued low-level exposure to 
benzene, incorrectly evaluated OSHA's compelling evidence. 
Joseph C. Morelli 
239. 577 F.2d at 825. 
240. 509 F.2d at 1301. 
